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Abstract
Many legal cases require decisions about causality, responsibility or blame, and these may
be based on statistical data. However, causal inferences from such data are beset by subtle
conceptual and practical difficulties, and in general it is, at best, possible to identify the “prob-
ability of causation” as lying between certain empirically informed limits. These limits can
be refined and improved if we can obtain additional information, from statistical or scientific
data, relating to the internal workings of the causal processes. In this paper we review and
extend recent work in this area, where additional information may be available on covariate
and/or mediating variables.
Key words: Balance of probabilities, Causes of effects, Counterfactual, Group to individual
inference, Mediator, Potential response, Sufficient covariate
1 Introduction
Many legal proceedings hinge on the assignment of blame or responsibility for some undesirable
outcome. In a civil case a patient may sue a pharmaceutical company for damage caused as a side
effect of one of its products; or a state health department may bring an action against a tobacco
company for not disclosing information it had on the health risks of smoking, thus (it is claimed)
leading to unnecessary deaths.
In many such cases there will be no dispute about the facts at issue. The patient took the drug
and suffered the side effect. The tobacco company admits to having withheld the information.
What remains at issue is the causal relation between the established facts. But any attempt
to understand this quickly throws us into the philosophical quagmire of counterfactual reasoning,
where we have to consider what might have happened in circumstances known to be false. Whether
or not the patient’s suit succeeds will depend on whether or not she can prove, to the appropriate
legal standard (e.g., “on the balance of probabilities”) that she would not have developed the same
outcome, had she not taken the pharmaceutical product. The damages that the tobacco company
are liable for will depend on an assessment of how many lives could have been saved, had they
made the information available.
In this article we concentrate on cases of the first kind, where it is desired to assess whether or
not the same outcome would have occurred had the putative causal event been absent. Typically,
epidemiological evidence will be admitted as to the frequency of the adverse outcome, both in
patients who have, and in patients who have not, been exposed to the product. Although such
evidence is clearly of relevance, it is less clear exactly how. A common procedure is to compute
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the relative risk (RR), obtained by dividing the frequency of the outcome among those exposed
to the product by the corresponding frequency among those not so exposed. And it is frequently
asserted that a relative risk exceeding 2 is enough to prove that the “probability of causation”
(PC) exceeds 0.5, and thus to establish a causal link “on the balance of probabilities”.
In this paper we consider such arguments in greater detail. We explain why it is difficult to
establish a precise value for the probability of causation on the basis of epidemiological or other
scientific evidence, which at best can only provide interval bounds for PC. We also show how it is
possible to reduce the uncertainty about PC by collecting and taking account of additional data,
so shedding some light on the internal workings of the causal black box.
The work presented here builds on a long-standing interaction and collaboration with Stephen
Fienberg, as represented in particular by the recent papers Dawid et al. (2014); Dawid et al.
(2015); Dawid et al. (2016b). This formed a very small component part of Steve’s many highly
significant contributions to the correct use of Statistics in the Law, which work, substantial as it
was, itself constituted only a very small component of his numerous original and highly influential
contributions over an enormous range of statistical topics. He was a delightful friend and a
stimulating colleague and companion; he is sorely missed.
2 Group to individual analysis: The basic problem
Epidemiology attempts to discover causal relationships, such as between a certain exposure, E
and a certain response, R. Such a relationship can be intuitively represented by a diagram such
as that of Figure 1. (There is a formal semantics underlying such diagrams, but we shall not delve
into that here).
E R 
Figure 1: Simple cause-effect relationship
Epidemiological experts are frequently called on to testify in cases revolving around the as-
signment of individual responsibility. However, such testimony can only concern the behaviour of
groups of individuals, and its relevance to any individual case is at best indirect. The general issue
of “group-to-individual” (“G2i”) inference has recently become a centre of attention both within
and outside the Law (Faigman et al. 2014).
In our context, the important distinction to be made is between inference about “Effects of
Causes” (“EoC”), and inference about “Causes of Effects” (“CoE”). The former, concerning the
likely outcome of a contemplated intervention or exposure, in a specific or generic individual, is
the focus of most scientific investigation and experimentation, including epidemiological studies.
However, it is the latter, concerning the possible causes of an observed effect in an individual case,
that is of most relevance for the Law. The distinction between EoC and CoE is crucial, but all
too often goes unremarked and unappreciated.
We illustrate the subtle relationship between these two forms of inference by means of an
example (Dawid 2011; Dawid et al. 2014).
Effects of Causes (EoC) Ann has a headache. She is wondering whether to take aspirin. Will
that cause her headache to disappear?
Causes of Effects (CoE) Ann had a headache and took aspirin. Her headache went away. Was
that caused by the aspirin?
To assist in addressing these questions, we assume that we have data from a very large, well-
conducted, randomised trial of the success of aspirin in curing headaches, whose subjects can be
assumed to be similar to Ann in the way they respond. This yields percentages as in the following
table:
2
Recover Not recover Total
No aspirin 12 88 100
Aspirin 30 70 100
Table 1: Results of aspirin trial
3 A framework for analysis
Effects of Causes (EoC) Ann can argue as follows “If I take the aspirin, I will be just like the
subjects in the treatment group, so I can assess my probability of recovery in this case as
30%. Similarly, If I don’t take the aspirin, my probability of recovery in that case can be
assessed to be 12%. Other things being equal, it would be better to take the aspirin.” While
this argument does, not, perhaps address the question exactly as posed, it does give Ann
fully adequate guidance to address and solve her EoC decision problem. What is at issue
was the as yet unknown event of recovery, and the data are directly relevant for assessing
uncertainty about that unknown outcome (for each of the two decisions that Ann might
take).
Causes of Effects (CoE) Things are very different for the CoE question. Indeed, there is now
no unknown event : We know that Ann definitely took the aspirin, and she definitely re-
covered. What is at issue here is not uncertainty about an as yet unknown event, but
uncertainty about a relationship between known events: the existence, or otherwise, of a
causal relationship between taking the aspirin and recovering.
3.1 Counterfactuals and potential outcomes
One way of thinking about whether a certain outcome was caused by a certain exposure is to ask the
question: “Would the same outcome still have occurred, even if the exposure had been absent?”.
Because this question is posited on a hypothesis that is known to be false, and thus counter to
known facts, it is termed a counterfactual query. There is much discussion of counterfactuals in
the philosophical literature (see e.g. Menzies (2014)), and they raise many perplexing problems. In
particular, is it even meaningful to regard a counterfactual as having a definite (even if unknown)
truth value?
Supposing that we can talk of the truth value of counterfactual, we might reinterpret the
assertion “The exposure caused the outcome” as:
“Both the exposure and the outcome occurred; and had (counterfactually) the exposure
not occurred, neither would the outcome have occurred.”
With this interpretation, and taking account of the known facts, the truth value of the assertion
“The exposure caused the outcome” becomes identified with the (typically unknown) truth value
of the counterfactual proposition “In the counterfactual world where the exposure did not occur,
the outcome did not occur”.
Some comments
(i). There is an implicit “ceteris paribus” condition in the above interpretation. In the counter-
factual world being considered, we are changing the truth value of the exposure, but nothing
else—or, at any rate, nothing else occurring before, or simultaneously with, the exposure.
We must of course allow for the outcome to change, and we might possibly also allow changes
to other, later, events (perhaps intermediate between the exposure and the outcome), in the
light of the change to the exposure. Since there are various ways in which our counterfactual
comparison world can be constructed, there is a resultant ambiguity in the truth value of
the counterfactual assertion. Lewis (1973) argues that we should use the “closest possible
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world” to the real world, subject to the counterfactual change in the exposure—but this still
leaves a great element of vagueness.
(ii). There may be some choice as to what the counterfactual value of the exposure would have
been, if it had been other than it actually was. If Ann had not taken two aspirins, she might
have taken none at all, or taken three aspirins, or taken two paracetamol tablets, or gone to
bed with a wet towel around her head. The counterfactual query only becomes precise when
we have fully specified the “counterfactual foil” for comparison with the factual exposure.
(iii). There will typically be a variety of different exposures that we can consider. For example,
Ted has been a smoker for 20 years, has lived by a busy main road which is subject to
high air pollution, and has developed lung cancer. Then we could ask “Was Ted’s cancer
caused by his smoking?”, “Was it caused by his air pollution exposure?”, “Was it caused
by his smoking and the air pollution jointly?”, etc., etc. Each of these questions involves
consideration of a different counterfactual world for comparison with the real world, and
there is no reason why we could not regard all of them as true simultaneously—which leads
to some difficulties in understanding what might be the “actual cause” of Ted’s cancer
(see Halpern (2016) for a thoughtful analysis of the elusive concept of “actual cause”). In
particular, we should not express “Ted’s smoking caused his cancer” as “The cause of Ted’s
cancer was his smoking”—though we might say “A cause of Ted’s cancer was his smoking”.
The former phrasing suggests, misleadingly, that there is a variable, “The cause of Ted’s
cancer”, that can take different values (e.g., smoking, air pollution, natural causes). But
as these putatuve causes are not mutually exclusive, there can be no such variable. And
when we can assign probabilities to “Ted’s smoking caused his cancer”, “Air pollution caused
Ted’s cancer”, etc., it is perfectly acceptable for these to sum to more than 1. (For a specific
example of this, see Hutchinson et al. (1991)).
The standard framework of probability theory does not easily admit argument about counter-
factual worlds and uncertain relationships. To formulate such questions meaningfully, we need to
expand the universe of discourse. The way this has traditionally been done in statistics is by the
introduction of so-called “potential outcomes” (Neyman 1935; Rubin 1978). We consider a binary
exposure, or cause, variable E, and a binary response, outcome, or effect, variable R. For each
value e = 0 or 1 of E, we introduce a variable Re, conceived as the value that R would assume,
were it the case that E = e. If in the actual world E = 1 (say), then the observed outcome
will be R = R1; in this case we have no way of observing R0, which thus becomes a (necessarily
unobservable) counterfactual variable. Similarly, if in the actual world E = 0, then R = R0,
and R1 becomes counterfactual and unobservable. It is typically assumed, explicitly or implicitly,
that the bivariate variable R := (R0, R1) is determined before the value of E is, and does not
depend on how that value of E came to be determined or known (for example, whether by external
intervention, or by observation alone). The effect of setting or observing E = 1 (say) is just to
uncover the pre-existing value of R1, and identify R with R1. In particular, although the pair
(R0, R1) is modelled probabilistically just like any other bivariate random variable, there is the
epistemic problem that there are no circumstances in which it would be possible to observe both
its constituent values. This has been termed “the fundamental problem of statistical causality”
(Holland 1986).
The framing and analysis of causal questions in terms of potential outcomes has become the
industry standard in statistical causality. For the investigation of “effects of causes”, it has been
strongly argued that this approach is both unnecessary and potentially misleading (Dawid 2000;
Dawid 2015). However, for studying causes of effects there is currently no alternative to the use of
potential outcomes to model counterfactual possibilities. Nevertheless, the logical difficulty that
the bivariate quantity R can never be fully observed creates subtle problems that must not be
ignored.
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3.2 The probability of causation
Armed with the above machinery and notation, we can now formulate an expression for the
probability of causation.
We interpret the expression “the exposure E = 1 causes the outcome R = 1” as the event “EC:
R1 = 1, R0 = 0”. This encodes the property that the potential response to E = 1 is 1, while at
the same time the potential response to E = 0 is 0. However, although we have thus expressed
the causality relation as an event, in what appears to be a standard probabilistic framework, the
fundamental problem of statistical causality implies that this is an event whose truth value can
never be determined.
Suppose now that (for Ann) we have observed E = 1 and R = 1 (or, equivalently, E = 1
and R1 = 1). Since we must condition on all known facts, the appropriate expression for the
probability of causation (in Ann’s case) is
PC = Pr(EC | E = 1, R = 1)
= Pr(R0 = 0 | E = 1, R1 = 1). (1)
However, merely establishing a notational expression for the probability of causation does not, of
itself, solve the problem of how to evaluate this quantity, involving as it does the probability of
an unobservable event.
The approach we shall take is to regard the pair (R0, R1) as having a joint distribution (jointly
with all other variables in the problem), but to make no assumptions about that distribution, other
than any constraints imposed by empirically observable information. Typically it will not then
be possible to identify that joint distribution fully, but only to constrain it within limits—though
those limits will depend on the precise form of the available information.
There is a further point that needs to be taken into account. The variables in (1) are those
pertaining specifically to Ann, and the joint distribution Pr appearing in it is thus a distribution
over those specific variables. But who is the analyst assigning this distribution? It might be Ann
herself, or some onlooker. These individuals will typically have different background information,
and so different distributions. In particular, an onlooker might reasonably infer, merely from
observing that Ann decided to take the aspirin (E = 1), that her headache is particularly bad,
and consequently that her potential responses R0 and R1 are both likely to be poorer than if he did
not have this information. For Ann, however, the severity of her headache is known background
information that is already taken into account in her own distribution, and the mere fact that
she is contemplating taking the aspirin gives her no additional information about her potential
responses. That is to say, for Ann’s own probability distribution we can reasonably invoke the
“no confounding” assumption,
E⊥⊥R, (2)
which expresses probabilistic independence between the fact of her exposure, E. and the pair R
of her potential responses. In this case expression (1) simplifies to
PC = Pr(R0 = 0 | R1 = 1). (3)
However, for the onlooker who is not initially aware of the severity of Ann’s headache, it may be
inappropriate to accept (2), and hence (3).
In most of the sequel (with the exception of § 5) we shall assume that the analyst has sufficient
background information about Ann for (2) to be true (to a good enough approximation), and hence
use (3) as the expression for the probability of causation. Furthermore, because we shall wish to use
external data from other individuals to assist in estimating the analyst’s probability distribution
Pr for Ann, we shall also need to assume that the background information the analyst has on those
individuals is essentially the same as what he1 has for Ann — a condition that can sometimes
be met by restricting the set of external individuals considered. Even so, these assumptions,
necessary for much of our analysis, are highly restrictive, and will often be inappropriate. Careful
consideration must be given to their suitability before applying our results.
1We refer to the analyst in the masculine, to distinguish him from the subject, Ann—while not precluding that
they could be the same individual.
5
4 Basic analysis
We start by considering the case that the only available empirical information is that presented
in Table 1.
Assuming the analyst can regard the individuals in the trial as similar to Ann, he might argue:
“When Ann takes aspirin, she puts herself in the same position as those external individuals
in the treatment group, of which Pr(R = 1 | E = 1) = 30% recovered. Because of the no
confounding assumptions (both in the data and for Ann), this means that her potential response
to taking aspirin, R1, has a 30% probability of taking the value 1 (Recover). I can thus identify
my marginal probability (for Ann), Pr(R1 = 1) = 0.3. Similarly, I can evaluate my marginal
probability Pr(R0 = 1) = 0.12. However, because of the fundamental problem of statistical
causality, there is no further empirical information available relating to my joint distribution of
(R0, R1).”
Armed with this limited information, the analyst can attempt to fill in the entries in Table 2,
specifying his bivariate probability distribution for (R0, R1). The margins are fully determined by
the above empirically informed probabilities, but since he has no empirical information directly
relevant to the joint probability Pr(R0 = 0, R1 = 1), he simply enters an unknown (and unknow-
able) value x in the associated internal cell of the table. In combination with the known marginal
probabilities, this allows completion of the body of the table, as shown.
Table 2: Joint distribution of potential responses R0 and R1.
R0
R1 0 1
0 0.88− x x− 0.18 0.70
1 x 0.30− x 0.30
0.88 0.12 1
Now although the precise value of x remains unknown, from the table we can extract partial
information about it, using the fact that any probability must be nonnegative. Applying this
principle to the four entries in the body of the table, we obtain: x ≤ 0.88, x ≥ 0.18, x ≥ 0,
x ≤ 0.30. Combining these and omitting redundancies gives the inequality: 0.18 ≤ x ≤ 0.30. This
interval bound is the full information available about x on the basis of the empirical data.
Now because of assumption (2), PC = Pr(R0 = 0 | R1 = 1) = x/0.30. Thus the analyst can
assert:
0.6 ≤ PC ≤ 1. (4)
Even under the restrictive assumptions that have been made, this wide interval bound is all that
can be deduced, from the empirical data, about the probability of causation in this particular case.
The above logic can be applied in the general case, leading to the following interval bound in
terms of empirically estimable quantities (under our no-confounding assumptions):
max
{
0, 1− 1
RR
}
≤ PC ≤ min
{
1,
Pr(R = 0 | E = 0)
Pr(R = 1 | E = 1)
}
, (5)
where
RR :=
Pr(R = 1 | E = 1)
Pr(R = 1 | E = 0) (6)
is the (causal) risk ratio. We note that RR > 2 implies PC > 0.5, which might be taken to prove
causation “on the balance of prbabilities”. However, if RR < 2 we can not deduce from (5) that
PC < 0.5 (to reject causation, on the balance of probabilities).
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5 Allowing for unobserved confounding
When we cannot assume (2) we cannot simply apply the above theory directly, since the very
fact that Ann decided to take the aspirin gives the analyst some indirect information about Ann’s
state of health—in the light of which it would no longer be appropriate to consider her as similar
to the individuals in the experimental study, for which this information was not available. Tian
and Pearl (2000) showed that in this situation we can still obtain bounds for PC, so long as, in
addition to the experimental data, we also have observational data on individuals whose behaviour
(in the opinion of the analyst) can be considered similar to that of Ann, in that they have the
same dependence as she does between their decision E to take the aspirin and their pair R of
potential responses. Tian and Pearl (2000) then derive the following interval bounds:
max
{
0,
Pr(R = 1)− Pr(R0 = 1)
Pr(E = 1, R = 1)
}
≤ PC ≤ min
{
1,
1− Pr(R0 = 1)− Pr(E = 0, R = 0)
Pr(E = 1, R = 1)
}
, (7)
where Pr(R0 = 1) denotes the recovery probability in the experimental control group, who were
externally assigned to have E set to 0; while the other probabilities are obtained from the ob-
servational data (interestingly, we do not require experimental data on those who were assigned
treatment).
For example, suppose that, in addition to the experimental data of Table 1, we have obser-
vational data in which Pr(E = 0, R = 1) = 0.12. We then find that the lower bound in (7) is
1—allowing us to establish causation with certainty.
6 Peeking into the box
So far we have considered the relationship between exposure and response as a causal “black box”,
without attempting to understand or model its hidden mechanisms in any further detail. If we are
willing to make some assumptions about these mechanisms, or access external information about
them, we can make better causal inferences from our data—even in the absence of any further
information about Ann.
6.1 Monotonicity and beyond
One assumption commonly made is monotonicity . In a context such as ours, this would say that, if
recovery would have occurred without the treatment, it would certainly occur with the treatment.
That is to say, R0 = 1 ⇒ R1 = 1. This implies in particular Pr(R0 = 1) ≤ Pr(R1 = 1), or
equivalently RR ≥ 1. This is a constraint on the margins of a table such as Table 1, and so
could be falsified; but even when this marginal constraint is satisfied, there is typically no further
information to help us decide whether monotonicity holds or not. Nevertheless it is frequently
taken as a reasonable requirement, and would add one further constraint on the entries in Table 1:
Pr(R0 = 1, R1 = 0) = 0. Since in that table Pr(R0 = 1, R1 = 0) = x− 0.18, we can then compute
the exact value x = 0.18, so that PC = 0.18/0.30 = 0.6. Here (as in general), monotonicity allows
as to replace the interval given by (5) by its lower endpoint 1− 1/RR. In this case, RR < 2 does
imply PC < 0.5.
Monitonicity, while appealing, is a strong, perhaps overstrong, assumption about the internal
workings of the causal black box. Moreover, because it is a property of the pair of values (R0, R1)
considered jointly, the fundamental problem of statistical causality implies that we can never
expect to obtain empirical evidence to let us decide whether or not monitonicity does in fact hold.
For that reason we take a different approach in the rest of this paper, focusing on using additional,
empirically observable, information to shed some light on internal causal mechanisms, and thus
improve causal inferences. In such cases, although we typically cannot obtain an exact point value
for the probability of causation, we may be able to narrow the interval bounds on it. We shall
particularly consider cases in which we might have information on additional covariates and/or
mediators that influence the causal pathway.
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7 Covariate information
Suppose that, in the experimental data, we can also observe an additional covariate, X — an
individual characteristic that can vary from person to person, and can affect that person’s response.
This situation is represented by the diagram of Figure 2. For simplicity, we suppose that X can
E R 
X 
Figure 2: Covariate
only take a discrete set of values. We can then estimate, from the data, the response probability,
Pr(R = 1 | E = e,X = x), among those individuals having covariate value X = x and exposure
level e (= 0 or 1).
In those cases that we are also able to measure X for Ann, say X = x∗, we can simply restrict
the experimental subjects to those having the same covariate value (who are thus like Ann in all
relevant respects), and apply the analysis of § 4. We can then use formula (5), after first replacing
all the probabilities in (5) and (6) by their conditional versions, given X = x∗.
However, it turns out that we can make use of the additional covariate information in the
experimental data, even when we cannot observe X for Ann. For this case, it is shown in Dawid
(2011) that we have the interval bounds
∆
Pr(R = 1 | E = 1) ≤ PC ≤ 1−
Γ
Pr(R = 1 | E = 1) (8)
where
∆ =
∑
x
Pr(X = x)×max {0,Pr(R = 1 | E = 1, X = x)− Pr(R = 1 | E = 0, X = x)}
Γ =
∑
x
Pr(X = x)×max {0,Pr(R = 1 | E = 1, X = x)− Pr(R = 0 | E = 0, X = x)} ,
and that this interval is always contained in that given by (5), which ignores the additional
covariate information.
Example 7.1 Suppose that the covariate X is binary, taking values 0 and 1 with equal probability.
Suppose further that, from the experimental data, we obtain the following probabilities:
Pr(R = 1 | E = 1, X = 0) = 0.12
Pr(R = 1 | E = 0, X = 0) = 0.24
Pr(R = 1 | E = 1, X = 1) = 0.60
Pr(R = 1 | E = 0, X = 1) = 0.12.
These imply marginal recovery probabilities (not taking the value of X into account):
Pr(R = 1 | E = 1) = 0.36
Pr(R = 1 | E = 0) = 0.18.
(i). If we had not observed X, either in the data or in Ann, we would use the marginal values,
to obtain a relative risk of 2, and interval bounds
0.5 ≤ PC ≤ 1.
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(ii). If we observe X both in the data and in Ann, we obtain
0.8 ≤ PC ≤ 1
if Ann has X = 1, and
0 ≤ PC ≤ 1
if Ann has X = 0.
(iii). Finally, if we have observed X in the data but not in Ann, the relevant interval becomes
0.67 ≤ PC ≤ 1,
an improvement on that of (i)
2
8 Sufficient covariate
In § 7 above it was assumed that the assignment of exposure E was unrelated to the covariate
X. Here we relax this, and allow X to influence both the exposure E and the response R.
But we assume that there are no further, unobserved, variables that might act to confound this
relationship—X is a “sufficient covariate” (Guo and Dawid 2010; Dawid 2015) for assessing the
causal effect of E on R. The relevant diagram is now that of Figure 3. We assume that the
E R 
X 
Figure 3: Sufficient covariate
identical same structure holds for the individuals in the data and for Ann. X is observed in the
data, but possibly not for Ann.
When X is observed for Ann, say X = x∗, we can again apply the basic inequalities (5), after
replacing the probabilities in (5) and (6) by their conditional versions, given X = x∗.
When X is not observed for Ann, the interval bounds for PC become:
1
Pr(R = 1 | E = 1) ×
∑
x
max{0, {Pr(R = 1 | E = 1, X = x)− Pr(R = 1 | E = 0, X = x)}
× Pr(X = x | E = 1)
≤ PC ≤
1− 1
Pr(R = 1 | E = 1) ×
∑
x
max{0, {Pr(R = 1 | E = 1, X = x)− Pr(R = 0 | E = 0, X = x)}
× Pr(X = x | E = 1). (9)
Now in this case we can alternatively use the “back-door formula” (Pearl 2009):
Pr(R0 = 1) =
∑
x
Pr(R = 1 | E = 0, X = x)× Pr(X = x) (10)
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to recreate the experimental response rate among the controls—and so compute the interval (7).
However, this would be tantamount to ignoring the additional information on X in the data. It
can be shown that the interval given by (9) is always contained in that given by (7).
Example 8.1 Suppose X is binary, and from the data we obtain the following probabilities:
Pr(X = 1) = 0.5
Pr(E = 1 | X = 0) = 0.8
Pr(E = 1 | X = 1) = 0.2
Pr(R = 1 | E = 1, X = 1) = 0.2
Pr(R = 1 | E = 0, X = 1) = 0.8
Pr(R = 1 | E = 1, X = 0) = 0.8
Pr(R = 1 | E = 0, X = 0) = 0.2.
Then we obtain the following lower bounds for the probability of causation (the upper bound
being 1 in all cases):
When Ann is observed to have X = 1: PC ≥ 0
When Ann is observed to have X = 0: PC ≥ 0.75
When Ann’s value for X is not observed: PC ≥ 0.71
Ignoring X and using the Tian and Pearl (2000) bounds : PC ≥ 0.53.
2
9 Complete mediator
We now turn to consider the case, represented by the diagram in Figure 4, that the causal effect
of E on R is completely mediated by some variable M , assumed for simplicity to be binary. That
is to say, E affects M and M effects R, and the combination of these two pathways constitutes the
totality of the effect of E on R. We assume that there is no further confounding of either of these
E M R 
Figure 4: Complete mediator
relationships, either in the data or for Ann. We shall consider the case that all three variables
(E,M,R) are observed in the data, but that we only observe E and R for Ann.
Note that our assumptions imply the conditional independence property R⊥⊥E |M , so that
Pr(R = r | E = e) =
∑
m
Pr(R = r |M = m)Pr(M = m | E = e), (11)
which should hold, at least approximately, in the data. In any event, we should estimate Pr(R = r | E = e)
using formula (11), rather than directly. (We could also have separate experimental data on the
E →M and M → R relationships, and apply (11).)
It is shown in Dawid et al. (2016a) that (with this understanding) the additional information
on the mediator does not affect the lower bound in (5). However, we obtain the following improved
10
upper bound:
1
Pr(R = 1 | E = 1)
×min{ Pr(M = 0 | E = 0) Pr(R = 0 |M = 0) + Pr(R = 0 |M = 1) Pr(M = 0 | E = 1),
Pr(M = 1 | E = 1) Pr(R = 0 |M = 0) + Pr(R = 0 |M = 1) Pr(M = 1 | E = 0),
Pr(M = 0 | E = 0) Pr(R = 1 |M = 1) + Pr(R = 1 |M = 0) Pr(M = 0 | E = 1),
Pr(M = 1 | E = 1) Pr(R = 1 |M = 1) + Pr(R = 1 |M = 0) Pr(M = 1 | E = 0) }.
(12)
Example 9.1 Suppose we obtain the following values from the data:
Pr(M = 1 | E = 1) = 0.25
Pr(M = 1 | E = 0) = 0.025
Pr(R = 1 |M = 1) = 0.9
Pr(R = 1 |M = 0) = 0.1.
Marginalising over M using (11), we obtain the same values as in Table 1. On applying (12),
we get 0.60 ≤ PC ≤ 0.76; whereas without taking account of the mediator M the bounds were
0.6 ≤ PC ≤ 1. 2
We can elaborate the above analysis by allowing for an additional sufficient covariate X, as
represented by Figure 5, that can modify all the above marginal and conditional probabilities, and
conditional on which M is a complete mediator.
E M R 
X 
Figure 5: Complete mediator with covariate
We assume that X is always observed in the data. If we observe X = x for Ann, we simply
replace all probabilities by their versions further conditioned on X = x, yielding bounds l(x) ≤
PC ≤ u(x), say. If we do not observe X in Ann, the lower bound is E{l(X) | E = 1, R = 1)}, and
the upper bound is E{u(X) | E = 1, R = 1)}.
10 Partial mediator
In the case of a partial mediator, as represented by Figure 6, there us an additional “direct effect”
of E on R, that is not mediated by M (again supposed binary, for simplicity). So now we have
to consider the effect of E on M , and the joint effect of E and M on R. Again we suppose that
there is no further confounding of these relationships, either in the data or for Ann, and consider
the case that all three variables (E,M,R) are observed in the data, but that we only observe E
and R for Ann.
In Murtas et al. (2016) it is shown that, once again, the lower bound for PC is unaffected by
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E M R 
Figure 6: Partial mediator
the additional information on M . However, we are able to abtain a new upper bound u, where
Pr(R = 1 | E = 1)× u = min {Pr(R = 0 | E = 0,M = 0), Pr(R = 1 | E = 1,M = 0)}
×min {Pr(M = 0 | E = 0), Pr(M = 0 | E = 1)}
+ min {Pr(R = 0 | E = 0,M = 0), Pr(R = 1 | E = 1,M = 1)}
×min {Pr(M = 0 | E = 0), Pr(M = 1 | E = 1)}
+ min {Pr(R = 0 | E = 0,M = 1), Pr(R = 1 | E = 1,M = 0)}
×min {Pr(M = 1 | E = 0), Pr(M = 0 | E = 1)}
+ min {Pr(R = 0 | E = 0,M = 1), Pr(R = 1 | E = 1,M = 1)}
×min {Pr(M = 1 | E = 0), Pr(M = 1 | E = 1)} . (13)
Example 10.1 Suppose that, from the data, we estimate the following probabilities:
Pr(M = 1 | E = 0) = 0.27
Pr(M = 1 | E = 1) = 0.019
Pr(R = 1 | E = 0,M = 0) = 0.02
Pr(R = 1 | E = 0,M = 1) = 0.835
Pr(R = 1 | E = 1,M = 0) = 0.685
Pr(R = 1 | E = 1,M = 1) = 0.857.
Marginalising over M , these imply
Pr(R = 1 | E = 0) = 0.24
Pr(R = 1 | E = 1) = 0.69.
We then obtain 0.65 ≤ PC ≤ 0.81 when accounting for the mediator, compared with 0.65 ≤ PC ≤ 1
when ignoring it. 2
However, accounting for a partial mediator may not always yield improved bounds.
Example 10.2 Suppose the probabilities estimated from the data are as follows:
Pr(M = 1 | E = 0) = 0.96
Pr(M = 1 | E = 1) = 0.74
Pr(R = 1 | E = 0,M = 0) = 0.02
Pr(R = 1 | E = 0,M = 1) = 0.33
Pr(R = 1 | E = 1,M = 0) = 0.91
Pr(R = 1 | E = 1,M = 1) = 0.73.
These imply
Pr(R = 1 | E = 0) = 0.32
Pr(R = 1 | E = 1) = 0.78.
The lower bound is PC ≥ 0.59. The upper bound obtained from (13) is PC ≤ 0.95. However, just
ignoring M , and applying (5), we get upper bound PC ≤ 0.88, which should theregore be used in
preference. 2
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Again, we can elaborate the problem by including a sufficient covariate X, conditional on
which we have the above structure, as represented by Figure 7. Let the appropriate lower and
upper bounds, computed with all probabilities conditioned on X = x, be l(x) and u(x). Then
in the absence of information about X for Ann, the relevant lower and upper bounds for PC are
E{l(X) | E = 1, R = 1}, E{u(X) | E = 1, R = 1}.
E M R 
X 
Figure 7: Partial mediator with covariate
11 Discussion
We have assumed throughout that the available data are sufficiently extensive to allow essentially
perfect estimates of the required probabilities. Of course this will never be the case. Dawid et al.
(2016b) consider how to make suitable inferences about PC from limited data, using a Bayesian
approach.
We have presented some simple cases, involving covariates and mediators, where having addi-
tional information about the internal structure of the causal link between exposure and response
enables us to refine our causal inferences. Other problems might involve a more complex collection
of variables and pathways, perhaps expressed as a directed acyclic graph. It should be possible to
extend our analysis to such more general cases. Information on different causal subsystems might
be obtained from a variety of scientific investigations. But caution must be exercised in justifying
the transfer of such information from generic scientific data to the individual case. Additional
uncertainty over the correct representation of the problem must also be taken into account.
To return, finally, to the issue facing a court of law that has to return a decision on causality:
we hope we have shown that this is not a simple matter! We can only express our sympathy with
a judge who has to make such a decision, on the “balance of probabilities,” when the best possible
conclusion, based on available scientific evidence and the kind of analysis we have presented here,
is that the probability of causation lies between 0.4 and 0.8.
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